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ABSTRACT
Background: It is well known that many healthcare
systems have poor reliability; however, the size and
pervasiveness of this problem and its impact has not
been systematically established in the UK. The authors
studied four clinical systems: clinical information in
surgical outpatient clinics, prescribing for hospital
inpatients, equipment in theatres, and insertion of
peripheral intravenous lines. The aim was to describe
the nature, extent and variation in reliability of these
four systems in a sample of UK hospitals, and to
explore the reasons for poor reliability.
Methods: Seven UK hospital organisations were
involved; each system was studied in three of these.
The authors took delivery of the systems’ intended
outputs to be a proxy for the reliability of the system as
a whole. For example, for clinical information, 100%
reliability was deﬁned as all patients having an agreed
list of clinical information available when needed
during their appointment. Systems factors were
explored using semi-structured interviews with key
informants. Common themes across the systems were
identiﬁed.
Results: Overall reliability was found to be between
81% and 87% for the systems studied, with signiﬁcant
variation between organisations for some systems:
clinical information in outpatient clinics ranged from
73% to 96%; prescribing for hospital inpatients
82e88%; equipment availability in theatres 63e88%;
and availability of equipment for insertion of peripheral
intravenous lines 80e88%. One in ﬁve reliability
failures were associated with perceived threats to
patient safety. Common factors causing poor reliability
included lack of feedback, lack of standardisation, and
issues such as access to information out of working
hours.
Conclusions: Reported reliability was low for the four
systems studied, with some common factors behind
each. However, this hides signiﬁcant variation between
organisations for some processes, suggesting that
some organisations have managed to create more
reliable systems. Standardisation of processes would
be expected to have signiﬁcant beneﬁt.
INTRODUCTION
Delivering high reliability has been a focus of
safety conscious industries such as aviation
and nuclear power for many years with
impressive results.
1 It has also become
important in many other industries to the
extent that we now assume our microwave
oven and mobile phone will work every time
we use them and that our car will always start.
The area in which airlines may not be seen as
reliable is in handling our luggage; here the
worst performer in a recent online report
2
was said to have lost 28 items for every 1000
passengers. Put another way, reliability was
seen as poor at 97.2%. In healthcare the
situation is very different and it is well known
that many systems have poor reliability.
34
Some studies have found reliability as low as
50% in delivering recommended evidenced-
based care for clinical conditions.
35
Different patient characteristics may explain
some variation but it might reasonably be
expected that the routine processes that
support clinical care, such as ensuring rele-
vant information is available to doctors in
clinics, will have high reliability.
Most previous studies of reliability in
healthcare have focused on speciﬁc care
processes in isolation. Differences between
these studies make it difﬁcult to compare
their results and to identify common factors
behind poor reliability due to the different
ways in which the concept of reliability has
been interpreted and applied. As a result, the
size and pervasiveness of poor reliability in
the UK NHS and its impact on staff and
patients has not been established systemati-
cally. The purpose of our research therefore
was to examine the reliability of four impor-
tant and common clinical systems in UK
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Original researchhospitals and to investigate the causes of poor reliability.
The systems were: availability of clinical information in
surgical outpatient clinics; prescribing for hospital
inpatients; availability of equipment in theatres; and
availability of equipment needed for the insertion of
peripheral intravenous lines.
The systems studied were selected to represent those
known to be important to clinicians and where evidence
exists of system failure. For example, in the UK over
39000 reports were received by the National Patient
Safety Agency relating to failures in documentation in
2007
6 and in Australia
7 1.8% of medical errors were
found to be due to the unavailability of clinical infor-
mation. In a survey of theatre team members, respon-
dents believed that nearly 10% of errors in the operating
theatre were related to equipment problems.
8 Equip-
ment problems are also likely to cause disruption of
workﬂow, delay case progression and lead to deteriora-
tion in the dynamics between team members. It is esti-
mated that 1e2% of hospital inpatients are harmed by
medication errors, the majority of which are errors in
prescribing.
91 0One in three UK hospital inpatients has
at least one peripheral venous catheter.
11 The incidence
of infection associated with these is usually low; however,
due to the high frequency with which peripheral cathe-
ters are used, serious infectious complications produce
considerable morbidity.
11 12
Our aim was to describe the nature, type, extent and
variation in the reliability of the four healthcare systems
in a sample of UK hospitals using the same methods to
identify common issues and themes. We took the
delivery of the intended systems outputs to be a proxy
for the reliability of the system as a whole. For example,
the system designed to deliver equipment in working
order to a theatre for a speciﬁc operation was seen as
having failed if the equipment was not available when
the surgeon needed it. This paper reports a synthesis
of the ﬁndings from more detailed studies of each of
the four systems and highlights the common systems
failures.
METHODS
Design
A prospective descriptive study of the reliability of four
systems, conducted in seven NHS organisations. Three
of the seven organisations were participating in phase
one of the Health Foundation’s ‘Safer Clinical Systems’
programme.
13 Four additional organisations were
selected to increase the breadth of the sample in terms
of geographical spread and other characteristics. Anal-
ysis of a range of publicly available data for these orga-
nisations demonstrated that they represented a range
with respect to their safety performance (online
appendix)
14 and the ﬁndings therefore likely to be
applicable to the wider NHS.
Each system was studied in three of the seven organi-
sations, chosen on the basis of interest in the topic and
to spread the workload. The study employed a mixed
methods approach. For each system, we conducted
a quantitative assessment of reliability, supplemented by
a series of semi-structured interviews with key people in
each organisation exploring the causes of systems fail-
ures. Data collection took place in spring/summer 2009.
Quantitative assessment of reliability
Data on reliability were collected for each of the four
systems. Brieﬂy, we identiﬁed key areas within each
process in which to collect data relating to reliability.
Speciﬁc methods for data collection were determined
according to the system concerned, and through
discussion with study organisations and the clinicians
involved. Some data were collected directly by the
research team, and some by nominated local leads.
Members of the research team trained staff in partici-
pating organisations in the methods of data collection
when needed and conducted all analyses. The deﬁni-
tions against which reliability was measured and the
methods of data collection for each system are
summarised in table 1. As part of data collection, we also
asked those identifying problems to estimate their likely
impact on patient safety and delays to patient care. More
speciﬁc details of the methods used for each are
presented elsewhere.
14 16 17
Qualitative exploration of system failures
For each system we explored the causes of the poor
reliability identiﬁed, using qualitative semi-structured
interviews with key informants in each organisation.
Potential interviewees were identiﬁed by local study
coordinators, given a participant information sheet and
invited to sign a consent form. Interviews were mainly
conducted face to face, although some were conducted
by telephone, depending on availability and preference
of the interviewee. We made audiotapes of interviews if
possible, or took detailed notes if interviewees preferred.
These interviews were then transcribed and analysed
using the accident causation model
18 as the theoretical
framework. For each topic, a sample of at least one in
four interview transcripts was checked by a second
researcher. Associated subthemes were then drawn from
these data and veriﬁed by a second researcher. The
themes and subthemes from all systems were then
grouped under the headings in the accident causation
model. Following discussion between all researchers, the
ﬁndings were synthesised across all systems, drawing out
common themes across systems.
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Overview of systems reliability
We found overall reported reliability to be between 81%
and 87% for the systems studied (table 2). However, in
some cases these ﬁgures hide signiﬁcant variation
between organisations. For example, reliability for the
availability of clinical information ranged from 73% in
organisation E to 96% in organisation A (p<0.001; c
2)
and the availability of equipment in theatres ranged
from 63% in organisation D to 88% in organisation
F( p <0.001).
Implications for patient safety and delays to care
When systems failed, clinical staff often considered there
was a threat to patient safety. In the outpatient clinics,
15% of 1161 patients had some type of relevant clinical
information missing, and of these, surgeons considered
that 20% were associated with a risk of harm. For inpa-
tient prescribing, we found errors in 15% of 6605
medication orders, of which 19% were predicted to have
serious consequences to the patient if not corrected. In
the operating theatre, 19% of 490 operations were
affected by equipment problems, and of these, 21%
were associated with threats to patient safety. Finally,
problems occurred in 13% of 350 cannula insertions, of
which 23% were judged to have some impact on patient
safety.
Approximately 10% of the 490 operations were
delayed, some by over 30 min, because of missing or
faulty equipment. In outpatient clinics, missing clinical
information led to 1.7% of 1161 patients being given
a repeat appointment. A total of 69% of the prescribing
errors required the ward-based pharmacist to contact
a member of medical staff, and/or write in the patient’s
medical notes to resolve the problem.
Factors contributing to poor reliability
A total of 51 interviews were conducted across all systems
and organisations. The contributory factors were
Table 1 Summary of quantitative data collection methods by system
System
Deﬁnition against which
reliability was measured Method of data collection
Sample: total and by
organisation
1 Clinical information availability
in hospital outpatient clinics
Core data set of information
required in a typical surgical
outpatient clinic*, as agreed
by surgeons. 100% reliability
deﬁned as all patients having
all required information
available at the time of their
appointment
Form completed by surgeons
in clinic about missing
information, including
perceived risks and the action
taken as a result
Total: 1161 outpatient
consultations
A: 411
E: 423
G: 327
2 Prescribing for hospital
inpatients
A published, validated,
deﬁnition of a prescribing
error was used
15
100% reliability deﬁned as all
medication orders being error
free
Prescribing errors in newly
written inpatient and
discharge medication orders
identiﬁed and recorded by
ward pharmacists. Medical
admissions and surgical
wards were studied. Clinical
importance assessed using
a validated method
Total: 6605 medication
orders
A: 2689
B: 1812
C: 2104
3 Equipment availability
in the operating theatre
100% reliability deﬁned as all
operations having the required
equipment available and in
working condition at the time
it was needed
Theatre staff collected data
on equipment failures in
trauma and orthopaedics,
general surgery and paediatric
operating theatres, including
perceived delays to operation
and threats to patient safety
Total: 490 operations
studied
A:258
D:67
F:165
4 Systems for inserting
peripheral intravenous lines
100% reliability deﬁned as
having all equipment needed
to insert the intravenous line
available to staff at the time
required
Staff performing cannulations
in accident and emergency
departments and acute
medical wards completed
data collection forms after
each procedure, including
perceived threats to patient
safety
Total: 350 intravenous
line insertions studied
A:76
D:62
F:212
*Past medical history; referral or other specialty letter; discharge summary; current medication; allergies; radiology/imaging results; diagnostic
test results; procedure notes/anaesthetic record; electrocardiogram report; blood laboratory results; outpatient medical record/last clinic letter.
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model
14:
< Organisation and management factors: a lack of
accountability or ownership of issues, for example,
no one taking responsibility for the contents of
a patient’s medical record or for resolving equipment
problems in theatres; rather they blamed others for
any problems. Also difﬁculties arising out of normal
working hours such as access to information or
supplies.
< Work environment: the design of systems (such as
using a mixture of paper and computer records) and
workspace (such as storerooms where equipment for
intravenous line insertion is kept, making it hard to
ﬁnd items and to see if stock needs replenishing).
< Team factors: poor communication, including a lack
of feedback mechanisms, for example, prescribing
errors being corrected by a pharmacist and the
individual doctor not informed, poor documentation
of medication changes in patients’ health records, and
problems with stock control for cannulation equip-
ment not being reported to those with responsibility
for this.
< Individual staff factors: here the main issues were
a lack of training; poor or no induction into clinical
areas; and a lack of familiarity with how systems
worked.
< Task factors: no standardisation, for example, in how
certain drugs are prescribed or discontinued on the
paper chart, and how equipment is stored in theatres.
Also a perception of over-complexity of processes, for
example, systems for obtaining health records and
off-site preparation of equipment.
Some additional organisational factors, while less
pervasive than those above, were also identiﬁed. These
included the challenges associated with managing
‘outlier’ patients on remote wards and unclear hand-
writing. Similar issues were found relating to informa-
tion in outpatient clinics and prescribing, both involving
ordering care (medication, tests or investigations) and
issues involved in communicating these requests in
a timely fashion. As would be expected, there were also
common issues identiﬁed between the systems for
obtaining operating theatre equipment and the equip-
ment needed for the insertion of intravenous cannulae.
There was also a lack of feedback about stock levels,
including poor communication about requirements,
lack of clarity about responsibilities for ordering and
checking stock levels, and lack of systems to automati-
cally highlight when stock levels were incorrect. Lack of
resources was also raised as an issue in relation to
obtaining equipment needed in operating theatres, but
to a much lesser extent for the other systems studied.
We found that in many areas, over time, staff had come
to accept poor reliability as normal, thus not reporting
or challenging problems; for example, acceptance of
missing equipment in theatres or wrong equipment in
cannulation packs.
When asked how cases of poor reliability were dealt
with, in some cases staff described the workarounds they
Table 2 Reliability of each clinical system measured
System
Reported reliability (95% CI) by
organisation (AeG)
Overall reported
reliability (95% CI)
across all
organisations
p values (null
hypothesis: all
organisations
are equal)
Clinical information
availability in hospital
outpatient clinics
96% (94%
to 98%)
n¼411
A
73% (69%
to 77%)
n¼423
E
87% (83%
to 91%)
n¼327
G
85% (83% to 87%) of
outpatient appointments
had all information
available
n¼1161
<0.001
Prescribing for hospital
inpatients
86% (85%
to 87%)
n¼2689
A
88% (87%
to 90%)
n¼1812
B
82% (80%
to 84%)
n¼2104
C
85% (84% to 86%) of
prescriptions were
error free
n¼6605
<0.001
Equipment availability
in the operating theatre
81% (76%
to 86%)
n¼258
A
63% (51%
to 75%)
n¼67
D
88% (83%
to 93%)
n¼165
F
81% (78% to 85%) of
operations had no
equipment problems
n¼490
<0.001
Systems for inserting
intravenous lines
80% (71%
to 89%)
n¼76
A
88% (80%
to 96%)
n¼62
D
88% (84%
to 92%)
n¼212
F
87% (84% to 91%) of
line insertions had all
equipment available
n¼350
0.236
Deﬁnitions are given in table 1.
More detailed statistical analysis for each system is available in the main research report.
11
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from patients rather than their health records, or using
disposable gloves as tourniquets, for which the risks
could not directly be assessed. In some cases, risks were
taken such as making clinical decisions without infor-
mation and transferring used sharps to sharps bins in
remote locations.
11e13
STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS
The strengths of this study are that we studied each
process in three organisations, using standard methods
and deﬁnitions. While participating organisations were
not randomly selected, the use of multiple organisations
increases generalisability compared with most similar
studies, which have been based at only one site. We have
also been able to synthesise common factors across more
than one process, using a published and widely used
model of the factors that affect clinical practice.
The main limitation is that quantitative data collection
was based on self-recording by hospital staff. This may
result in under-reporting. However, we tried to minimise
the extent of any under-reporting by choosing processes
in which poor reliability is an annoyance for the staff,
making them more likely to be motivated to report
problems. We also kept data collection periods relatively
short to reduce data collection fatigue, made data
collection forms as simple to complete as possible, and
offered help and support through the research team and
local coordinators.
There may also be some response bias in the qualita-
tive data collected in the interviews, in relation to the
selection of interviewees and/or their responses.
Potential interviewees were identiﬁed by local coordi-
nators on each site, and it is possible that they may have
identiﬁed interviewees who were interested in this type
of work or likely to be amenable to participation.
DISCUSSION
Overall the reported reliability in the clinical systems
studied was between 81% and 87%. Put another way, the
clinical systems studied failed on 13e19% of occasions.
In everyday life this would mean your car not starting
1 day every week or your luggage being lost once in every
four overseas trips you take. Would you still use email if
you knew that one email in seven would not reach its
intended recipient? For a UK hospital these ﬁgures
mean doctors dealing with missing clinical information
for one in every seven patients seen in clinics; missing or
faulty equipment in one of seven operations performed
(two in every ﬁve operations in some organisations); and
time wasted by nurses and pharmacists correcting prob-
lems and searching for records or equipment for four or
ﬁve patients every day on a typical 30-bed ward. We also
found that about 20% of reliability failures were associ-
ated with a potential risk of harm. On this basis it is
hardly surprising that patient safety is routinely
compromised in NHS hospitals,
19 20 and that clinical
staff come to accept poor reliability as part of everyday
life. Furthermore the systems studied are only a small
part of the total healthcare delivery process for indi-
vidual patients and it is very likely that the total reliability
for the whole clinical pathway will be orders of magni-
tude lower than the 81e87% found for the individual
systems in this study.
The variation in reliability between organisations, with
much higher levels of reliability identiﬁed in some,
suggest that it is possible to create more reliable systems,
although even these can probably be improved upon.
This variation also illustrates the danger of averaging
performance across organisations. Common factors
causing poor reliability were found across systems. These
included a lack of feedback mechanisms; lack of stand-
ardisation; and issues such as access to information or
supplies out of normal working hours. Other factors
common to more than one system include stock control,
handwriting and the management of ‘outlier’ patients
on remote wards. This would suggest that improving
common system factors in organisations could have
a bigger impact on patient safety than current
approaches focusing on individual areas of risk.
21 For
example, creating good feedback systems would inﬂu-
ence all the clinical systems studied here and also many
other areas of clinical work. Improving stock control
mechanisms would also have an impact across a number
of key clinical systems, making the lives of clinical staff
less frustrating and improving patient safety. More
important perhaps is the need to develop a culture of
challenge and feedback so that poor reliability and the
associated potential for patient harm are no longer
accepted by staff as part of normal everyday work.
Industries such as aviation and oil production have
a track record of success in this area, standardising
processes and equipment whenever possible, under-
standing the human factors involved and working to
improve safety climate. Many NHS organisations have
started work to introduce these practices, for example,
using the WHO surgical safety checklist; using lean
manufacturing methods; training teams in crew resource
management; and standardising care using clinical
pathways. However, our research indicates that there is
much more work to do before the UK NHS can claim to
offer patients levels of reliability in their care to match
even the best within other hospitals, let alone other
safety conscious industries.
Based on the approach of the US Institute for
Healthcare Improvement (IHI), reliability of <80e90%,
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common process, whereas reliability of around 95%
suggests the presence of a clearly articulated process.
4
On this basis, our results indicate that for healthcare
organisations in the UK to begin to improve the reli-
ability of their core processes, they need to articulate or
document the process as it is expected to function and
deﬁne the required outputs. This is a prerequisite for
measuring levels of reliability and for understanding
where processes fail.
For two systems, availability of information in outpa-
tients, and availability of equipment in operating
theatres, patients experienced a delay to their care as
a result of poor reliability. This indicates scope for
savings with improved reliability since every new
appointment and every delay in theatre is likely to add to
healthcare costs. There are also broader opportunity
costs that may be substantial, such as suboptimal care,
adverse events, loss of conﬁdence by patients and refer-
ring general practitioners, and the potential for medical
negligence claims.
Finally further research is recommended to build on
the work presented here using standardised methods
and deﬁnitions to study reliability across multiple orga-
nisations. More work is also needed to understand how
and why clinical systems fail with particular emphasis on
the systems, including organisational context and
behaviours, rather than isolated focus on process rede-
sign. Such research would contribute to understanding
the context within which speciﬁc solutions are intro-
duced, such as care bundles. In these times of ﬁnancial
stringency, healthcare would beneﬁt from further studies
to explore the economic consequences of poor reli-
ability and to quantify the link between reliability and
harm.
CONCLUSIONS
Considerable attention has been given to reliability in
healthcare in recent years, most notably in safety initia-
tives such as the IHI’s ‘5 million Lives’ campaign in the
USA,
22 and ‘Patient Safety First’ in England.
23 Here the
focus has been on reliably delivering speciﬁc care
requirements to patients, such as on-time antibiotics and
prophylaxis of venous thromboembolism. Less attention
has been given to the reliability of the overall system of
care within which these care requirements reside. From
our ﬁndings it is clear that improving the reliability of
clinical systems must become a priority for hospital
leaders to reduce costs and improve patient safety, for
example, making all clinical information available for
every patient seen in clinics and correct and functioning
equipment for every patient in theatres. The authors
hope that presenting these ﬁndings will raise the proﬁle
of systems reliability and its associated but unseen impact
on staff and patients.
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